| English Translation | Greek Original [note] | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | That which is completely happy and indestructible has no troubles itself, nor does it give trouble to others, so that it is not affected by anger or gratitude; for all such things exist through weakness. [note] | τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει· ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον. |
| 2. | Death is nothing to us; for what has disintegrated lacks awareness, and what lacks awareness is nothing to us. [note] | ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δʼἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. |
| 3. | The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long joy is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress. [note] | ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δʼἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθʼὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, ουκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον. |
| 4. | Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; instead, the sharpest pain lasts the shortest time, a pain that exceeds bodily pleasure lasts only a few days, and diseases that last a long time involve delights that exceed their pains. [note] | οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμβαίνει· αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν. |
| 5. | It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live joyously. [note] | οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως <οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως· ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐχ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν. |
| 6. | It is a natural benefit of leadership and kingship to take courage from other men (or at least from the sort of men who can give one courage). [note] | ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τʼᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι. |
| 7. | Some people want to be well esteemed and widely admired, believing that in this way they will be safe from others; if the life of such people is secure then they have gained its natural benefit, but if not then they have not gained what they sought from the beginning in accordance with what is naturally appropriate. | ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι ὤστε, εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλὴς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων βίος, ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλὴς, οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον ὠρέχθησαν. |
| 8. | No pleasure is bad in itself; but the means of paying for some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves. [note] | οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθʼἑαυτὴν κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς οχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν. |
| 9. | If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another. | εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα ἡδονὴ τ<όπ>ῳ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἄν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί. |
| 10. | If the things that produced the pleasures of those who are decadent washed away the mind's fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that is what is bad). | εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τούς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν <καὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων> ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι μεμψαίμεθα αὐτοῖς πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν. |
| 11. | If our suspicions about astronomical phenomena and about death were nothing to us and troubled us not at all, and if this were also the case regarding our ignorance about the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no need for science. [note] | εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου, μήποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ᾖ τι, ἔτι τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν επιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἄν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας. |
| 12. | It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths. So it is impossible to experience undiluted enjoyment without science. [note] | οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἡ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις, ἀλλʼ ὑποπτεύοντά τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους· ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν. |
| 13. | It is useless to be safe from other people while retaining suspicions about what is above and below the earth and in general about the boundless unknown. [note] | οὐθὲν ὄφελος ἦν τὴν κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν παρασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστώτων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ ἁπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ. |
| 14. | Although some measure of safety from others comes from the power to fight them off and from abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd. [note] | τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τε ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ, εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια. |
| 15. | Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire, but the riches incited by mindless opinion are boundless. [note] | ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει. |
| 16. | Chance steals only a bit into the life of a wise person, whereas throughout the complete span of his life the greatest and most important matters have been, are, and will be directed by the power of reason. | βραχέα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διῴκηκε καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χρόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικήσει. |
| 17. | One who acts aright is utterly steady and serene, whereas one who goes astray is full of trouble and confusion. [note] | ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δʼ ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γήμων. |
| 18. | As soon as the pain produced by the lack of something is removed, pleasure in the flesh does not increase but only varies. Yet the limit of enjoyment in the mind is produced by reasoning about these very things and similar things, which once provoked the greatest fears in the mind. | οὐκ ἀπαύξετι ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονή, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τὸ κατʼ ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται. τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ πέρας τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεγέννησεν ἥ τε τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγισις καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις, ὅσα τοὺς μεγίστους φόβους παρεσκεύαζε τῇ διανοίᾳ. |
| 19. | Infinite time and finite time contain the same amount of enjoyment, if its limits are measured out through reasoning. [note] | ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ. |
| 20. | The flesh assumed that the limits of enjoyment were infinite, and that infinite enjoyment could have been produced only through infinite time. But the mind, reasoning about the goal and limits of the flesh and dissolving fears about eternity, produced a complete way of life and therefore had no need of infinite time; yet the mind did not flee enjoyment, nor when events caused it to exit from life did it look back as if missing any aspect of the best life. | ἡ μὲν σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴν χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν· ἡ δὲ διάνοια τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασε, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδεήθη· ἀλλʼ οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐδʼ ἡνίκα τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν τὰ πράγματα παρεσκεύαζεν, ὡς ἐλλείπουσά τι τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου κατέστρεψεν. |
| 21. | One who perceives the limits of life knows how easy it is to expel the pain produced by a lack of something and to make his entire life complete; so that there is no need of the things that are achieved through struggle. [note] | ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατʼ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν· ὥστε οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων. |
| 22. | You must reflect on the fundamental goal and everything that is clear, to which opinions are referred; if you do not, all will be full of trouble and confusion. [note] | τὸ ὑφεστηκὸς δεῖ τέλος ἐπιλογίζεσθαι καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ἐφʼ ἣν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ πάντα ἀκρισίας καὶ ταραχῆς ἔσται μεστά. |
| 23. | If you fight against all your perceptions, you will have nothing to refer to in judging those which you declare to be false. | εἰ μαχῇ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὐχ ἕξεις οὐδʼ ἃς ἂν φῇς αὐτῶν διεψεῦσθαι πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀγωγὴν κρίνῃς. |
| 24. | If you reject a perception outright and do not distinguish between your opinion about what will happen after, what came before, your feelings, and all the layers of imagination involved in your thoughts, you will throw your other perceptions into confusion with your trifling opinions; as a result, you will reject the very criterion of truth. And if when forming concepts from your opinions you treat as confirmed everything that will happen after and what you do not witness thereafter, then you will not avoid what is false, so that you will remove all argument and all judgment about what is and is not correct. | εἰ τινʼ ἐκβαλεῖς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς· εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν <ἔχον>, οὐκ ἐκλείψεις τὸ διεψευσμένον, ὡς τετηρηκὼς ἔσῃ πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν κατὰ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς. |
| 25. | If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in agreement. | εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δίωξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλο τι, οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι. |
| 26. | The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to reject when they are hard to achieve or when they seem to produce harm. | τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὅσαι μὴ ἐπʼ ἀλγοῦν ἐπανάγουσιν ἐὰν μὴ συμπληρῶσιν, οὐκ εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλʼ εὐδιάχυτον τὴν ὄρεξιν ἔχουσιν, ὅταν δυσπορίστων ἤ βλάβης ἀπεργαστικαὶ δόξωσιν εἶναι. |
| 27. | Of the things that wisdom provides for the complete happiness of one's entire life, by far the greatest is friendship. [note] | ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις. |
| 28. | The same judgment produces confidence that dreadful things are not everlasting, and that security amidst the limited number of dreadful things is most easily achieved through friendship. | ἡ αὐτὴ γνώμη θαρρεῖν τε ἐποίησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηθὲν αἰώνιον εἶναι δεινὸν μηδὲ πολυχρόνιον καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίας μάλιστα κατεῖδε συντελουμένην. |
| 29. | Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from mindless opinion). [note] | τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ <ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ καὶ> οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι. |
| 30. | Among natural desires, those that do not bring pain when unfulfilled and that generate intense exertion arise from mindless opinion; and such desires fail to be stamped out not by nature but because of the mindless opinions of humankind. | ἐν αἷς τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιθμιῶν μὴ ἐπʼ ἀλγοῦν δὲ ἐπαναγουσῶν ἐὰν μὴ συντελεσθῶσιν, ὑπάρχει ἡ σπουδὴ σύντονος, παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν αὗται γίνονται, καὶ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν οὐ διαχέονται ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κενοδοξίαν. |
| 31. | Natural justice is a covenant for mutual benefit, to not harm one another or be harmed. [note] | τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. |
| 32. | With regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice; similarly for those peoples who have neither the power nor the desire of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed. | ὅσα τῶν ζῴων μὴ ἐδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλληλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἦν δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα μὴ ἐδύνατο ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. |
| 33. | Justice does not exist in itself; instead, it is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed that is agreed upon by those who gather together at some time and place. [note] | οὐκ ἦν τι καθʼ ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλʼ ἐν ταῖς μετʼ ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθʼ ὁπηλίκους δήποτε ἀεὶ τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι. |
| 34. | Injustice is not bad in itself, but only because of the fear caused by a suspicion that you will not avoid those who are appointed to punish wrongdoing. | ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθʼ ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλʼ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ, εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς. |
| 35. | It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection. [note] | οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρα τι ποιοῦντα ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι τιστεύειν ὅτι λήσει, κἄν μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος λαθάνῃ· μέχρι γὰρ καταστροφῆς ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ λήσει. |
| 36. | In general, justice is the same for all: what is mutually advantageous among companions. But with respect to the particulars of a place or other causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for all. [note] | κατὰ μὲν <τὸ> κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό· συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δήποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. |
| 37. | Among things that are thought to be just, that which has been witnessed to bring mutual advantage among companions has the nature of justice, whether it is the same for everyone or not. But if someone legislates something whose results are not in accord with what brings mutual advantage among companions, then it does not have the nature of justice. And if what brings advantage according to justice changes, but for some time fits our basic grasp of justice, then for that time it is just, at least to the person who is not confused by empty prattle but instead looks to the facts. [note] | τὸ μὲν ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρει ἐν ταῖς χρείαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας τῶν νομισθέντων εἶναι δικαίων ἔχειν τοῦ δικαίου χώραν <δ>εῖ, ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται ἐάν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό· ἐὰν δὲ <νόμον> μόνον θῆταί τις, μὴ ἀποβαίνῃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δίκαιου φύσιν ἔχει· κἂν μεταπίπτῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον, χρόνον δέ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττῃ, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν. |
| 38. | When circumstances have not changed and things that were thought to be just are shown to not be in accord with our basic grasp of justice, then those things were not just. But when circumstances do change and things that were just are no longer useful, then those things were just while they brought mutual advantage among companions sharing the same community; but when later they did not bring advantage they were not just. [back] | ἔνθα μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἁρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν τὰ νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔρων, οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια· ἔνθα δὲ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκέτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια κείμενα, ἐνταῦθα δὴ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαια ὅτε σενέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων, ὕστερον δʼ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια ὅτε μὴ συνέφερεν. |
| 39. | The person who has put together the best means for confidence about external threats is one who has become familiar with what is possible and at least not unfamiliar with what is not possible, but who has not mixed with things where even this could not be managed and who has driven away anything that was not advantageous. | ὁ <τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς> τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἄριστα συστησάμενος, οὗτος τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ὁμόφυλα κατεσκευάσατο, τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά γε· ὅσα δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸς ἦν, ἀνεπίμεικτος ἐγένετο καὶ ἐξηρείσατο ὅσα <πρὸς> τοῦτʼ ἐλυσιτέλει πράττειν. |
| 40. | All those who have the power to obtain the greatest confidence from their neighbors also live with each other most enjoyably in the most steadfast trust; and experiencing the strongest fellowship they do not lament as pitiful the untimely end of those who pass away. [note] | ὅσοι τὴν δύναμιν ἔσχον τοῦ τὸ θαρρεῖν μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ὁμορρούντων παρασκευάσασθαι, οὗτοι καὶ ἐβίωσαν μετʼ αλλήλων ἥδιστα τὸ βεβαιότατον πίστωμα ἔχοντες, καὶ πληρεστάτην οἰκειότητα ἀπολαβόντες οὐκ ὠδύραντο ὡς πρὸς ἔλεον τὴν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος προκαταστροφήν. |
[0] The Greek text used here generally follows that of G. Arrighetti as published in Epicuro Opere (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1960), with some attention paid to the text published in Volume 2 of The Hellenistic Philosophers by A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley (Cambridge University Press, 1987). Thanks to Dave Jilk for his comments on the translation. [back]
[1] The phrase "that which is completely happy and indestructible" is a roundabout way of referring to the gods (though see paragraph 27, where the same underlying concept is referenced in relation to human life). The Greek word μάκαρ, translated here as "completely happy", could also be translated as "blessed" or "blissful". (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #1.) [back]
[2] The phrase "what has disintegrated" is a reference to the body. (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #2.) [back]
[3] The word ἡδονή is often translated solely as "pleasure"; however, I also translate it as "delight", "joy", or "enjoyment" because the Greek word ἡδονή refers to any physical, emotional, or mental state that is filled with sweetness (ἡδύς), whereas the English word "pleasure" carries stronger connotations of a purely physical state (although compare phrases such as "the pleasures of philosophy"). Furthermore, although there is no hard and fast distinction between ἄλγος as bodily pain and λυπούμενος as mental distress, the former word tends to be used more in relation to the body and the latter more in relation to the mind or emotions; see also paragraph 10. [back]
[4] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #3.) [back]
[5] The word φρονίμως, translated here as "wisely", derives from the word for practical wisdom; although it is often translated as "prudently", the latter term is no longer commonly used in current English and to the modern ear sounds positively Victorian, which is why I have opted to translate φρονίμως as "wisely". The word καλῶς, translated here as "beautifully", has many meanings, including "nobly" and "honorably"; however, the root meaning of καλός is "beauty" in either the aesthetic or the ethical sense. On the word δικαίως as "rightly" instead of "justly", see the note to paragraph 17. (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #5.) [back]
[6] The phrase "taking courage" translates the verb θαρρεῖν, which is derived from the word for courage, daring, boldness, or confidence. The basic Epicurean sense I find in this paragraph is "if you were the king or a leader of men, you would take courage from the support of the men under your command (at least to the extent that they are the sort of men who can give you courage), and taking courage in that way would be a natural good for you -- but for the rest of us, we must take courage not from our followers but from ourselves and from our friends." [back]
[8] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #50.) [back]
[11] The word φυσιολογία, translated here as "science", more particularly refers to natural science (which nowadays is the only kind of science). [back]
[12] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #49.) [back]
[13] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #72.) [back]
[14] The word ἡσυχία, translated here as "solitude", can also mean "quietude" or "stillness" (translations that would also be quite consistent with the philosophy of Epicurus). The phrase "breaking away from the herd" is my attempt to render the Greek phrase ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν, which means literally "departing from the many" (οἱ πολλοί are "the masses" -- a phrase so useful it has been transliterated directly in English as "hoi polloi"). Note also that although the received text reads ἐκχωρήσεως ("departing"), the Greek word ἐκχορήσεως means "stepping out from the chorus" and thus draws a vivid contrast between the vibrant leading characters and the stolid mass of citizens in ancient Greek tragedies; scribal error could account for a change from omicron to omega here, especially because ἐκχορήσεως is much less common than ἐκχωρήσεως. [back]
[15] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #8.) [back]
[17] I have expanded the translation here to capture several meanings of the key terms: ἀταρακτότατος means "utterly without disturbance" and by extension steady or serene, whereas πλείστης ταραχῆς means full of trouble, disorder, or tumult (expanded here to "full of trouble and confusion"; see also paragraph 22 and the note thereto). The words ὁ δίκαιος and ὁ ἄδικος are often translated "the just man" and "the unjust man", but the modern concept of justice is almost purely social whereas the Greek word δίκαιος has a wider range of meaning that encompasses what is right, fitting, balanced, ordered, decent, civilized, etc.; I have attempted to capture this ambiguity through the phrases "one who acts aright" and "one who goes astray". (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #12.) [back]
[19] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #22.) [back]
[21] The word ἀγών, translated here as "struggle", originally referred to the contests pursued by athletes at public festivals such as the Olympic games; Epicurus is not necessarily counselling against personal discipline (such as that involved in learning true philosophy), but against the trials and dangers of action in the public arena. [back]
[22] Here the translated phrase "trouble and confusion" reflects the Greek words ἀκρισία (literally "indistinctness") and ταραχή (literally "trouble", "disorder", or "tumult"); see also paragraph 17 and the note thereto. [back]
[27] The concept of μακαρία, translated here as "complete happiness", is also referenced in paragraph 1 when Epicurus speaks of the gods. (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #13.) [back]
[29] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #20.) [back]
[31] The word σύμβολον refers to a covenant, contract, or other mutual agreement, especially in a legal sense a treaty between two city-states to safeguard trading between them. The verb βλάπτω means to hurt or damage someone or something, but not in a way that reflects willful injustice or wrongdoing (for which the verb ἀδικέω is used). [back]
[33] The word συνθήκη, translated here as "compact", is essentially the same as the word σύμβολον from paragraph 31. [back]
[35] (This paragraph is the same as Vatican Sayings #6.) [back]
[36] The word κοινωνία means a fellowship, an association, a partnership, a community, etc.; I have chosen to translate συμφέρον ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ as "what is mutually advantageous among companions" to emphasize the sense of a shared venture that is implicit in the Greek verb κοινωνέω. [back]
[37] The Greek phrase τιθέναι νόμον means to make legislation; here Epicurus contrasts man-made legislation with natural justice, which in somewhat old-fashioned English we might call natural law. [back]
[38] The word πρόληψις has a special meaning in the philosophy of Epicurus, and refers to the basic grasp that one has of a concept. [back]
[40] Somewhat reluctantly, I have translated the word οἰκειότης (from the Greek word for household) as "fellowship". I say reluctantly because my preferred translation is the obsolete English word "frith", which referred to the bonds of mutual loyalty and trust between family members, kinsmen, and friends, as well as the resulting feeling of mutual security (see <http://www.friggasweb.org/frith.html>). Unfortunately, the word "frith" has passed out of common usage and therefore is not appropriate for a modern translation of Epicurus (although the concept it identifies deserves to be resurrected). Other alternatives might include "intimacy", "kindliness", "friendly relations", "friendliness", "sense of community", even "sense of belonging". [back]
The translator has provided the following statement:
I, Peter Saint-Andre, made this translation of the Principal Doctrines of Epicurus from Greek into English in the year 2008. I hereby release all legal and moral rights to this work under all jurisdictions (including but not limited to the rights to copy, republish, translate, arrange, modify, and make derivative works from this work), and I grant anyone the right to use this work without conditions for any purpose. Therefore this work is free from all claims of copyright and has passed directly into the public domain.
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Last Updated: 2010-01-03